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During the nineteenth century the New Bedford whaling industry changed dra- 
matically: in size, in the composition of its capital stock, in the structure of 
output, in the distribution  of effort among various whaling  grounds, in the 
sources of labor supply, in the organization and techniques of production, and, 
no doubt, in other ways as well. Changes were made by whalemen in response 
to such developments as the discovery of new hunting grounds and shifts in 
the supplies of inputs and demands for outputs. Managers acted to cope with 
new problems and to exploit the new opportunities thereby created. How great 
were the challenges posed to the industry? In what ways did it respond? What 
degrees of success were achieved? 
The importance of the problems facing whalemen and of  the managerial 
responses can be established only if it is possible to measure their effects on 
some index of performance. The significance of  the opening of  the Western 
Arctic, for example, could be judged in terms of the impact of Arctic hunting 
on the productivity of  the industry and on its profits. Chapter 11 focuses on 
profits. Here we measure differences in productivity among whaling voyages 
and compute the effects of the principal factors believed to have influenced 
productivity. 
If information were available with respect to the amounts and the qualities 
of all inputs, there would be no productivity differences among voyages at all, 
except  for those  due to  disembodied  technical  change-that  is,  technical 
change not embodied in capital, including human capital. There would be only 
output differences,  which would be fully explicable in terms of the various 
inputs and their qualities-once  again, with the exception of productivity dif- 
ferences resulting from disembodied technical change. In fact, however, the 
information needed to make a full and entirely satisfactory accounting of the 
causes of output differences among firms is never available, and evidence with 
respect to whaling is no exception. The productivity measurements carried out 
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here refer  to the  productivity  of  undifferentiated  labor and undifferentiated 
capital, combined, and to no other inputs. The measurements are analyzed by 
means of multiple regression analysis; variables reflecting the volumes of other 
inputs (natural resources-the  whales), the qualities of inputs, and technologi- 
cal differences among voyages are entered on the right-hand side of the regres- 
sion, with the object of explaining differences in productivity among voyages 
in these terms. 
Recent work on the theory of index numbers has shown that outputs, inputs, 
and productivity can be measured as effectively by using index numbers as by 
fitting econometric functions. Such index numbers have been used in the analy- 
sis of time-series, cross-section, and panel data; they have been applied to firm, 
industry, and country data; and, of course, they have been used in multiproduct 
and  multifactor  circumstances.  They  can be  assembled  from evidence  on 
prices, outputs, and inputs, and they are relatively simple to compute. The in- 
dex used in this chapter-representing  a translog production function-has  a 
clear intuitive meaning. It consists of the difference between translog multilat- 
eral output and input indexes. The output and input indexes, in turn, are also 
simple. The aggregated outputs (inputs) of  a given whaling voyage are com- 
pared with the aggregated outputs (inputs) of the representative voyage, where 
the representative voyage is the average voyage. The exact form of the produc- 
tivity index is 
In the equation, lnh,,, is the productivity index (voyage specific); the R are the 
shares of  total revenue attributable to the three individual outputs; the  Y are 
quantities of the individual outputs; and Ware factor shares in income; the X 
are quantities of factor inputs; the R, lnY, W,  and InX  are average values across 
all voyages. Three outputs (sperm oil; whale oil, including blackfish and walrus 
oil; and baleen) and two inputs (labor and capital-man-months  and vessel 
ton-months) are distinguished. 
Although the index is very nearly ideal for our purposes, it is not entirely 
without problems. First, in principle the method can be applied only in cases 
in which there are no scale economies, and New Bedford whaling may not 
meet this requirement. As the results of the regression will show, large vessels 
were slightly more productive than small ones. The advantage to large vessels 
was not great, however, and it held over only a very limited size range. It is 
highly unlikely that the limited scale economies in whaling (if they existed) 
seriously compromise our use of the index. 
Second, since the index is cast in log form, it cannot accept zero values. For 
1. The index was  taken from Caves, Christensen, and Diewert  1982b. See also Heien  1983; 
Caves, Christensen, and Diewert  1982a; Diewert 1976; Nishimizu and Robinson  1984; Barnett, 
Offenbacher, and Spindt 1984; Denny and Fuss 1983. 299  Productivity 
inputs that requirement poses no problem: no voyage took place without both 
a crew and a vessel. That is not the case for outputs. Some voyages returned 
with sperm oil only, some with whale oil and baleen, and some with all three 
products.2 The problem might have been dealt with by treating the industry as 
three separate industries, consisting of specialists in sperm whaling, specialists 
in baleen whaling, and generalists, hunting all kinds of  whales. That did not 
seem to be the proper method. While it is true that some voyages began  as 
sperm-whaling or baleen-whaling voyages-and  some ended as they began- 
most whalemen would take whatever whales they found, especially on the way 
home with  stowage  space aboard.  Furthermore,  as prices  changed,  vessels 
would shift from an emphasis on one type of whale to an emphasis on another. 
The reality seems to have been a single fleet, rather than three separate fleets; 
and it called for a single analysis, rather than three separate analyses. The anal- 
ysis did recognize that specialization took place, by including on the right side 
of the regression equation variables taking account of it. 
We  treated the industry  as one industry, and we handled  the problem  of 
missing outputs in a practical, if  inelegant, way  commonly adopted in such 
circumstances. We assumed that the vessels, in fact, had small amounts of the 
nonexistent outputs, and replaced the zeros in the data set with these amounts. 
Values smaller than  the base of natural  logs produced  absurd results, but a 
value as small as ten-a  very small amount, compared with average voyage 
outputs-yielded  reasonable  results  (Davis,  Gallman,  and  Hutchins  1989, 
114-15).  We therefore  substituted ten barrels or pounds for any smaller re- 
ported value. 
Finally, the analysis deals only with voyages from which vessels returned 
safely to port. Voyages that ended with the sinking of the vessel or its abandon- 
ment or sale or condemnation in a foreign port were ignored. It is not clear 
how, in such circumstances, productivity  should be conceptualized and mea- 
sured, nor is it clear what could be learned about whaling productivity by con- 
sidering these cases. There are about 380 such voyages, of  a total of 4,73  1 in 
the data set. 
We made no adjustments to productivity for the loss of men or whaleboats 
and other gear, or for damage to the vessel short of complete loss. These events 
were regarded as normal incidents of  a whaling voyage, part of the flow of 
capital and labor expended in the process of production. Were comprehensive 
records of unusual losses available, they could be integrated into the analysis. 
Unfortunately, while there is much information of  this type (see chapters 10 
and 1  l), it is not comprehensive and it does not lend itself to simple quantita- 
tive expression. 
We are now in a position to consider the developments that history and the- 
2. In eighty-nine instances voyages ended with no output of any kind-the  vessels came home 
clean, as the whalemen said. Every one of these voyages, however, was aborted, typically because 
the captain became sick or died. The median length of  clean voyages was one month. These were 
not true whaling voyages, and we ignored them for present purposes. 300  Chapter 8 
ory suggest influenced whaling productivity, and the decisions made by  agents 
in their attempts to exploit or to offset the effects of these developments. 
8.1  Developments beyond the Control of Managers 
8.1.1  Supplies of Whales 
The drift of the industry productivity  index across time-falling  as the in- 
dustry expanded and rising very slightly as it contracted (see figure 1.1)-the 
persistent search for new hunting grounds, contemporary complaints, and even 
the  structure of  output, all suggest that as the industry  expanded there may 
have been pressures on the stocks of whales. Whale numbers may have been 
so hunted down that the search became ever more costly and less rewarding. 
The evidence assembled in chapter 4 is not consistent with this view, but nei- 
ther is it quite powerful enough to settle the issue. There is enough uncertainty 
to warrant running additional tests. 
To do so, we assembled annual indexes of hunting pressures on the whale 
populations of the four major grounds-the  Atlantic (including Hudson Bay 
and Davis Strait), the Pacific, the Indian, and the Western Arctic. Pressure in- 
dex numbers germane to the relevant  date and destination were attached to 
each voyage. For example, a vessel  that hunted in the Pacific was assigned 
sperm and baleen  pressure index numbers relevant to the Pacific and to the 
date of the voyage. If excessive hunting reduced productivity, the regression 
coefficients  of  these  indexes  should  have  negative  signs. Another  hunting- 
pressure index, combining sperm and baleen whales, was used in a second set 
of regressions. 
Details of the construction of the indexes are in appendix 8A. The indexes 
are  clearly  imperfect.  For example,  vessels  destined  for the  Pacific  often 
hunted in other oceans as well. Moreover, problems of whale scarcity, if they 
arose at all, probably affected specific grounds within an ocean, rather than the 
entire ocean. Unfortunately,  there is no way  to remove these imperfections. 
The indexes represent the best approach to the issue of whale scarcity that we 
were able to develop. Despite their crudity it is almost certainly the case that, 
if shortages of whales occasioned by overhunting lowered the productivity  of 
the New Bedford fleet, the signs on the regression coefficients of these indexes 
would record the fact. 
8.1.2  Competition among Whaling Vessels 
There is a second possible effect of hunting on measured productivity. Even 
if whale stocks were not being depleted, increased hunting might have led to 
lower productivity simply because of greater competition among vessels. One 
vessel coming on a pod of sperm whales might be able to take all the largest 
whales by itself; approaching the pod in company with other vessels, it would 
be less likely to come away with as many barrels of  oil. The one case slides 301  Productivity 
over into the other, of course. One vessel alone would be unable completely to 
destroy a pod, but three or four might do so. Still, it seems useful to distinguish 
analytically between the two cases: hunting pressures on the whale popula- 
tions, on the one hand, and competition  among whaling vessels, on the other. 
To that end a second index, reflecting whaling competition in each month 
and in each hunting ground, was constructed. The index number for any given 
ground and month is a ratio. The numerator is the number of vessel tons hunt- 
ing in that ground in that month. The denominator is the number of whales (all 
species combined) living there before intensive hunting began, per one hun- 
dred square miles.  Thus the index measures the number of vessel  tons  per 
whale per one hundred square miles of hunting ground. We assumed that each 
vessel hunted the ground its agent had specified, and that the competition index 
for the median month of a voyage adequately represents the competition faced 
by the vessel on that voyage. Appendix 8B gives more details of the construc- 
tion of the index. The limitations of  the hunting-pressure indexes (described 
above) are shared by the competition index. 
Competition  could  not  have been  all bad.  Not  infrequently,  two whalers 
The boats of four whaling vessels attack a pod of sperm whales off the coast of Hawaii 
in 1833.  The artist shows the stroke and harpooner’s oars of each boat on the port side, 
which was contrary to norrqal (invariable?) practice. 
Colored aquatint, 1838, reproduced courtesy of the Old Dartmouth Historical Soci- 
ety-New  Bedford Whaling Museum. 302  Chapter 8 
chose to hunt in concert, implying that, within limits, increased competition 
actually promoted greater productivity. Beyond these limits, however, it is rea- 
sonable to  suppose that competition  would  lead to a lessening  of  measured 
productivity. We therefore entered the index in quadratic form. We expected 
that the coefficient on the index would carry a positive sign, the coefficient on 
the index  squared,  a negative.  We expected that  the effects of  the negative 
element would overbalance the effects of the positive element at a relatively 
low level of competition. For example, although it was not uncommon for two 
vessels to hunt together, we know of no instances in which more than two did 
so. This strongly suggests that  the benefits of  cooperative  behavior did not 
extend beyond two vessels. 
From the point of view of the individual captain or agent, the effects of these 
two factors (hunting pressures and hunting competition),  if they had any ef- 
fects at all, were not consequences of managerial decisions. They were exoge- 
nous factors. so far as individual firms were concerned. 
8.1.3  Competition for Labor 
As chapter 5 shows, the structure of the whaling labor force changed in the 
period  1840-66.  The fraction of unskilled greenhands in a typical crew rose, 
as did the fraction of illiterate seamen. The quality of the crew could be said 
to have declined. At the same time the wage rates ashore for common and 
skilled workers rose, compared with the returns to whaling crewmen. It is rea- 
sonable to conclude from this evidence that opportunities ashore were improv- 
ing relative to opportunities afloat and that the best men were being bid out of 
the whaling labor pool. The results of such developments would surely tend to 
lower  the  productivity  of  whaling.  In  fact,  the standard  literature  assigns 
an important role in the decline of the American fleet to the declining quality 
of  crewmen.'  The evidence  presented  in  chapters  5  and  7  has  suggested 
that, coincident with shifts in the quality of crews, technical innovations were 
adopted that seem to have reduced the need for skilled crews. 
How should one interpret these changes? Did the competition of opportuni- 
ties ashore lead to less skilled crews, which in turn led to the adoption of new 
3. Charles Nordhoff's  account can be interpreted to mean that the share of greenhands in whal- 
ing crews rose with the duration of voyages. It became difficult to recruit for long voyages and 
more difficult to retain the crew; desertion became a serious problem. According to Nordhoff 
(1895, chaps. 1,2,  and pp. 234-36,245) experienced seamen were more likely to desert than were 
greenhands, since they had options not open to greenhands (e.g., the merchant marine). See also 
chapter 5 above. A study of  the records of whaling vessels suggests that deserting greenhands did 
have other opportunities. They could always sign on with a whaler heading home, since whalers 
seem persistently to have been filling berths emptied by desertion or death. This is the way Herman 
Melville came home, after two desertions from whalers. Note also that greenhands did not remain 
greenhands. Deserting after a year on a whaler, the former greenhand now had experience. Mel- 
ville started as a greenhand and ended in the exalted position of boatsteerer. Nonetheless, Nord- 
hoff's story is not his alone. See Hohman  1928, 66. It may be that the variable voyage length, 
discussed below, picks up some of the productivity effects of problems in recruiting and holding 
crew members, when the length of the typical voyage increased. 303  Productivity 
vessel and rigging designs? Or did shifts in technique directly produce changes 
in the structure of  the typical crew, without the intermediation of  changes in 
wage rates ashore? 
The importance of opportunities ashore can be tested by  introducing wage- 
rate series for shore occupations on the right-hand side of the regression equa- 
tion. If  the best men were being bid away from whaling, with deleterious ef- 
fects on productivity, the coefficients on these variables should be negative. 
The direct relationships among wage rates ashore, the skill mix of the typical 
crew, and productivity can be tested for the brief period  1840-58  and 1866, 
the only period for which relevant data are available. If  opportunities ashore 
were indeed of  primary importance, while technical changes represented an 
attempt to cope with the problem created by  changes in relative wages, one 
would still expect to find negative coefficients on wage rates ashore-evidence 
that the best crewmen were drawn to jobs ashore and that the productivity of 
the fleet dropped accordingly. The coefficients on the indexes of deterioration 
in crew quality, on the other hand, might be positive, reflecting the relative 
success in any given year of vessels that had adopted the new techniques. The 
two sets of variables might pick up two different aspects of important develop- 
ments-the  wage-rate series measuring the influences of  competition in the 
labor market on trends in whaling productivity, and the quality indexes measur- 
ing the differences in the cross-section between vessels that did and did not 
adopt the new techniques. 
8.2  Managerial Decisions 
Managers made five kinds of choices that could influence productivity: they 
chose the crew, the grounds in which to hunt, the types of whales to be hunted, 
the duration of the voyage, and the technical characteristics of the vessel. Deci- 
sions about the crew have been briefly discussed; the choice of captain will be 
taken up in chapter 10. The other decisions are discussed next. 
8.2.1  Hunting Grounds 
The vessel registrations of New Bedford list fifty separate hunting grounds 
as destinations. It would be possible to study the effects of managerial choices 
among  hunting grounds by  entering fifty  dummy variables-one  for each 
ground-in  the productivity regression. 
That is not a sensible procedure. A vessel sailing for the northwest coast of 
the United States was unlikely to confine its attentions to this ground alone, 
even if the hunting there were good, certainly not if the hunting proved poor. 
,It is safer to treat such a reported destination as an indication that the vessel 
was set to hunt the Pacific. The captain might not follow the agent’s instruc- 
tions precisely. He might, for example, slip over to the Indian Ocean, or even 
up into the Western Arctic; and surely he would take any opportunity to capture 
whales as he passed through the Atlantic on his way to the Pacific. Nonetheless, 304  Chapter 8 
the agent’s order to hunt some part of  the Pacific is a fair indicator that the 
vessel would spend most of its time in that ocean. 
There is a second reason for ignoring the detail and distinguishing as des- 
tinations  only  major  bodies  of  water-the  Pacific,  the Atlantic  (including 
Hudson Bay and Davis Strait), the Indian, the Western Arctic. Some agents 
reported, for example, that their vessels would hunt the Sea of  Japan or the 
Northwest Coast; most did not. They noted simply that a vessel would hunt the 
Pacific. Since most destination information is of this type, it is better to define 
the hunting-ground dummies at this level. 
In the regression the Pacific-the  most common destination-is  used as the 
basis of comparison. Dummies are entered for the Atlantic, Indian, and West- 
ern Arctic. Vessels reporting that they were headed, for example, for the Indian 
Ocean, the  Pacific,  and  the Western Arctic-that  is,  some combination  of 
grounds-are  necessarily  excluded. The numbers so excluded are not large, 
and the effects of their exclusion are unlikely to be imp~rtant.~ 
Before the fact it seemed reasonable to suppose that the regression would 
yield a positive sign on the Western Arctic dummy, a negative sign on the At- 
lantic, and a very small coefficient of  either sign on the Indian. Productivity 
might be expected initially to vary from ground to ground, the differences dis- 
appearing as the fleet adjusted its activities to exploit effectively newly discov- 
ered grounds. The Pacific, Indian, and Western Arctic were the newer grounds; 
on that basis alone they might be expected to yield, on average, higher levels 
of productivity  throughout the period. This is particularly true of the Western 
Arctic, which was discovered very late (1848). 
8.2.2  Specialization 
Specialization in a particular type of whale varied from vessel to vessel and 
voyage to voyage. In an effort to see how  far it mattered,  a set of dummy 
variables indicating the degree and type of specialization is included on the 
right side of the regression. Voyages are divided into three groups (of roughly 
equal size): those in  which sperm oil contributed at least 90 percent of  the 
value of  output, those in which whale oil and baleen contributed at least 90 
percent, and all others. (The all-other group is the comparison base.) 
8.2.3  Voyage Duration 
As the nineteenth century wore on, whaling voyages from New  Bedford 
grew longer. One explanation for this development is that they were hunting 
more distant grounds. Within each ocean the duration of voyages increased 
also, and the reason may be the invention and diffusion of new institutional 
arrangements. As the whaling fleet expanded, ports in the Azores, Western Aus- 
tralia, Panama, Hawaii, and California began to specialize in servicing it. They 
4.  There are 194 of these mixed-ground voyages out of  a total of  4,731 voyages in the data set. 
In another 71 cases we do not know the hunting ground. 305  Productivity 
provided repair facilities, provisions, a convenient system for shipping oil and 
bone back home, a place to fill out a cargo, and replacement crewmen. By the 
early  1830s a vessel  could sail to the Pacific  and plan to stay there  several 
years. Once the Western Arctic was opened and transcontinental railroads were 
in place, many vessels owned and registered in New Bedford made San Fran- 
cisco a second home port. 
Did these new arrangements contribute importantly to productivity improve- 
ment? Unfortunately, there  is no perfect quantitative  index to stand for the 
opening and expansion of refitting and reprovisioning ports. The best available 
measure of the extent to which a vessel used these facilities might be the dura- 
tion of the voyage, since the development of port facilities made it possible for 
whalers to stay longer at sea.5 Of  course, the length of  the voyage might pick 
up other characteristics of the venture, as well: unsuccessful captains may have 
stayed out longer, in hopes of recouping; longer voyages probably led to higher 
desertion rates, and desertion may have reduced productivity (see chapter 5). 
The interpretation  of the sign and coefficient of this variable is therefore not 
straightforward. Since the length of the voyage figures in the computation of 
productivity (labor input is man-months; vessel input is ton-months), the vari- 
able entered on the right-hand side of the equation is the square of the length 
of  the voyage. 
8.2.4  Technical Characteristics of the Vessel and Whalecraft 
The whaling  agent made many choices that had to do with the technical 
characteristics of his vessel: the rig, the size, and the age of the vessel, whether 
it was constructed for whaling or was a refitted merchantman, and the types of 
whalecraft to be put aboard. 
Rig. The rig choices have been described in chapter 6. In numbers the ship was 
the principal whaling vessel, although the bark became more important as time 
passed. The brig, schooner, and sloop were unimportant,  particularly during 
the high tide of New Bedford whaling. For purposes of the regression analysis, 
vessels are divided into two classes, ships and all others: we created a dummy 
variable with a value of one if the vessel was a ship and a value of zero if it 
was not. Since ships were the most common whalers, it would be reasonable 
to suppose that they were also the most productive, and so a positive coefficient 
on the ship dummy could be expected. 
5. Some of the sources on which the data set is based distinguish product shipped home from 
product carried home by  the vessel. Were this information complete in the years in which it is 
available, which it is apparently not, and were it available for all years covered by  the data set, 
which it is not, it would serve to signal one use made of  the facilities of  these ports and could be 
entered into the regression analysis. Although the data are not adequate for that purpose, they are 
good enough to show that the vessels that shipped product home stayed at sea longer than vessels 
that did not ship product home. See chapter 7. 306  Chapter 8 
Size. Over time the sizes of ships and barks increased. This was associated in 
part with the growing importance of the more distant hunting grounds, but 
probably also with increasing voyage length within each ground. The variable 
measuring size is entered in squared form (tonnage squared), because size also 
figures in the calculation of the productivity index. 
Mode of Entry into the Fleet. Some whalers were built expressly for whaling; 
more were transferred into the fleet from the merchant marine. The regressions 
distinguish the mode of entry. We expected to find that vessels built for whaling 
were more productive than those that transferred in, ceteris paribus. 
Technical Characteristics.  Since there were important changes in vessel design 
and rigging, some after 1849 and more after 1869, we distinguish vessels by 
period  of  construction. We expected vessels built in  the second half of the 
century to have been more productive than those built in the first half (ceteris 
paribus, of course), and we expected whalers built after  1869 to have been 
more productive than those built before 1870. 
Rerigging. In the second half of the century, a number of vessels were rerigged; 
generally, ships were rerigged  as barks.  Barks were easier to sail with few 
hands and were deemed to be more maneuverable than ships. These advantages 
were particularly important in the Western Arctic, a ground that was opened to 
whaling in the middle of the century. It seems reasonable to suppose that re- 
rigged vessels were more productive. This proposition is tested by entering a 
dummy for rerigged vessels. The test is imperfect, of course, since it compares 
rerigged vessels with all others, rather than with the prior experience of the 
vessels that were rerigged. 
Age. The age of the vessel (entered as age and age squared) captures the effects 
of more than a single set of forces. Elements of wear and tear that influenced 
productivity-a  technical characteristic that one might hope to pick up in the 
age variable-are  confounded with the consequences of qualitative differences 
among vessels. Effective vessels were presumably survivors; ineffective ves- 
sels were transferred by their owners to other activities, were condemned at an 
early age, or were destroyed in service. The regression coefficients should re- 
cord this influence as well as the influence of capital consumption. One should 
expect to find a positive sign on the coefficient for age, as poor vessels were 
screened out, and a negative sign on the coefficient for age squared, as wear 
and tear reduced even an efficient vessel’s effectiveness. 
In a further attempt to understand  the influence of the deterioration  of  a 
vessel’s productive capacity on an agent’s choices, the last voyage of each ves- 
sel is identified. If poor performance led to condemnation or transfer to another 
activity, the variable should have a negative sign. 307  Productivity 
Whalecraft. Whalecraft consists of the implements used in capturing whales. 
The chief inventions were introduced in the brief period from 1848 to 1865, 
and were widely diffused by  1870. In an attempt to provide a measure of their 
importance, outfitting books were searched for data on whalecraft.  Unfortu- 
nately, few are still extant. More important, the outfits do not exhibit enough 
voyage-to-voyage variation-particularly  when time is held constant-to  pro- 
duce good statistical results.6 The outfitting books do show that the diffusion 
of new techniques took place quickly. Consequently, the adoption of the new 
body of techniques can be reasonably proxied by a time dummy. The date 1 
January 1870 is selected for this purpose-observations  of voyages sailing in 
the years 1870 and later take the value one, while those of voyages sailing in 
earlier years take the value zero. 
Time. Time (represented as the voyage’s year of departure minus 1820) is en- 
tered simply as a detrender. The regression model is sufficiently complete that 
we did not expect the time variable to have a large or significant coefficient. 
8.3  Multivariate Analysis 
The Voyages Data Set contains evidence on 4,73  1 whaling voyages in 1789- 
1927, but this chapter is not concerned with all of them. Before 1821 the indus- 
try was unduly influenced by political and military events; after 1897 it con- 
sisted of only a handful of firms. Observations before 182  1 and after 1897 are 
therefore excluded from the  statistical analysis of this chapter. Voyages that 
ended in the loss of the vessel (about 380) and voyages that yielded no output 
(89) are also excluded, as are voyages for which the evidence is incomplete. 
As a result of these restrictions the largest data set figuring in the regressions 
contains 2,935 observations. 
This is a very large data set, by any standards. Is it also representative? If 
so, of what? New Bedford? All the East Coast ports? All the American ports? 
Unlike many other American whaling ports, New Bedford engaged in diversi- 
fied whaling (see chapter 1). It sent vessels to every hunting ground and was 
regarded at the time as representative  of American ports, taken together. The 
sample, however, was not drawn randomly from all American voyages. Indeed, 
it was not even drawn randomly from New Bedford voyages. 
To test the extent to which the sample resembles the universe of New Bed- 
ford voyages, 1821-97,  we compared average sample and universe values for 
each of the outputs, vessel tonnage, and length of voyage. The data appear in 
table  8.1,  panel  A.  The mean  tonnage  of  vessels  making  sample  voyages 
is about the same as the mean tonnage of vessels making universe voyages. 
Sample voyages  were  one  month  longer  than  universe  voyages,  but  also 
6. See Davis, Gallman, and Hutchins 1989, 131-33,  142-47,  where the outfitting data are con- 
sidered at length. 308  Chapter 8 
Table 8.1  Characteristics of the Voyages in the Productivity Sample and of the 
Voyages Composing the Universe of New Bedford Whaling Voyages, 
1821-97 
A. Outputs and Inputs 
Sample 
Universe'  N  (N = 2,935) 
Average output of 
Sperm oil (barrels)  764.6  3,373  769.8 
Whale oil (barrels)  978.3  3,373  995.2 
Baleen (pounds)  8,400.8  3,373  8,798.2 
Average inputs 
Vessel size (tons)  306.3  3,428  310.1 
Interval at sea (months)  31.7  3,435  32.7 
Average real value of catch ($)  47.800.9  3,373  49,667.1 
Average value of catch per ton-month ($)  4.923  -  4.898 
h 
B. Distribution of Voyages among Hunting Grounds' (%) 
Universe  Sample 
Atlantic  32.4  30.4 
Indian  13.0  13.8 
Pacific  47.8  48.6 
Western Arctic  6.8  7.2 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Sources: Voyages and Productivity data sets. 
dThe  universe consists of voyages beginning in  1821 through 1897 and ending with the return of 
the vessels to New Bedford, voyages for which there is information concerning at least one of the 
variables listed in this table. 
hThe  average vessel size, interval at sea, and real value of the catch were computed from universes 
of different sizes. 
voyages to one of these four grounds are reported (Hudson Bay and Davis Strait are included 
with the Atlantic). 
brought back somewhat more product. The value of real output per ton-month 
was almost identical for sample and universe voyages. This is an important 
point, since it suggests that productivity levels of  sample voyages, on average, 
are representative of the universe. 
Panel B contains a second comparison: universe and sample are distributed 
among the four major hunting grounds. The sample contains, proportionately, 
somewhat  fewer voyages  to the Atlantic  and  somewhat more to the other 
grounds than does the universe, but the differences are not great. 
These are not  sophisticated  tests,  but  perhaps no  sophisticated  tests  are 
called for. The sample is very large, compared with the universe, and its known 
relevant characteristics appear to mirror those of the universe. In what follows, 
the sample is treated as representative of New Bedford whaling, 1821-97;  it is 
probable that the sample also represents all East Coast whaling. Table 8.2  Productivity in New Bedford Whaling, Sailing Years 1821-97 
~ 












On all whales 
Competition index" 
Competition index squared 
Real common wage rate ashore 
Ratio, skilledkommon wage rate 
ashore 
Ships (compared to other rigs) 
Vessel tons squared 




Mode of entry to fleet (compared 
to built before 1850) 
Built as whaler 1850-69 
Built as whaler 1870-96 
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0.001  3** 
-  0.0008* * 
0.0003* 
-1.125  X 
-0.0048* 
- 
-  1.3001  * 
0.1524* 








































-  0.00003 
0.0299 
0.0958* 



























0.11  19* 
-0.6280* 
-  0.0002* 
-0.0024 
-0.0753 
Sources; Most of the data were taken from the Voyages and Productivity data sets, which are described 
in chapter 3 and in this chapter. The appendices to this chapter describe the hunting-pressure and competi- 
tion indexes and the sources of  these data series. 
The common wage-rate series was computed from David and Solar 1977, data on page 59 divided by 
data on page 16.  The skilled wage-rate index was derived by  multiplying the series on page 59 of  David 
and Solar by the skill ratios on page 307 of Williamson and Lindert (1980) and then dividing by the price 
index on page 16 of David and Solar. 
Notes: The wage rates ashore associated with each voyage are the wage rates in effect in the year the 
voyage began. 
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Table 8.2  (continued) 
The residuals were examined for evidence of heteroscedasticity.  None was found. Nevertheless, we ran 
a second test, regressing the residuals against the squares of the independent variables. The resulting F- 
statistic was ,398, and the adjusted R’  was -0.0047.  One coefficient variable was significantly different 
from zero at the 10 percent level; none of the others achieved significance at even this level. We therefore 
assumed that the regressions are not heteroscedastic. Thc issue is not very important in any case; hetero- 
scedasticity affects only the t values. Our sample is so large that, even if  the regression  is treated  as no 
more than descriptive of the sample. the description holds for more than 60 percent of the New Bedford 
whaling industry (sample = 2,935 voyages; universe = 4,73  1  voyages). 
There is a modest amount of collinearity, as one would expect from the long array of variables, several 
of which relate to time, or appear in quadratic form. Of the 253 paired relationships among the intercept 
and the independent varibles of  the second regression, 37 exhibit correlations of 20 or greater. Notice, 
however, that both the F- and r-statistics of this regression are excellent, and that the signs and values of 
the coefficients are quite stable, from one formulation of the model to the next (this table), and from one 
period to the next (compare this table with tables 8.5 and 8.6).  These results would be unlikely  to occur 
if  multicollinearity  were an important problem. 
The r-statistics were adjusted to allow for the large size of the sample. Adjusted f = CoefficienUadjusted 
standard error. Adjusted standard error = standard error multiplied by (population size minus sample size) 
divided by  (population size minus one). (See, for example, Freund and Walpole  1987, 278-80,  “finite 
sample correction factor for standard deviation when sample size is greater than 5 percent of the popula- 
tion size.”) 
“For a description of  the ways in which the hunting-pressure and competition indexes are entered into the 
regression, scc appendixes 8A and 8B. 
*Significant at the  I  percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level 
We thank David Guilkcy, James Murphy, and Michael Salemi for econometric advice. 
The results of  the first set of regressions  appear in table 8.2. Each of the 
equations explains over four-tenths of the productivity variance, a level of ex- 
planatory power that  is excellent for a pooled cross-section  time-series  data 
set, particularly in view of the role of  luck in this industry. The F values are 
very high, and most of the coefficient signs and values yield sensible interpre- 
tations. There is considerable stability in the coefficients from one regression 
formulation to the next. Levels of significance are exceptionally high. There is 
not much to choose among the three regressions. Before discussing the coeffi- 
cients, it may be useful to consider another test of the power of  the equations. 
Average productivity in the New Bedford whaling industry dropped sharply 
from the 1820s to the 1860s and then rose mildly to the 1890s (see figure 1.1 
and table 1.3). How far do the equations shown in table 8.2 explain this pattern 
of falling and rising productivity? A test of the following form was run: First 
a regression  was estimated  with productivity  as the dependent variable and 
dummies standing for the decades of the 1820s (the comparison base), 1830s, 
1840s, and so forth as independent variables. The equation was then reestim- 
ated, including the decadal dummies and all of the independent  variables of 
the regression equations (except time, whose place was taken by the decadal 
dummies).’ The changes in the coefficients of the dummies between the first 
and second runs measure the extent to which the comprehensive equation ex- 
7. The test was suggested by  Robert Evenson, to whom we give our thanks 311  Productivity 
plains the pattern of productivity change across time. The results obtained from 
the first equation in table 8.2 (the other two equations yield similar values) are 
shown in table 8.3. 
The comprehensive equation explains between  12 and  100 percent of the 
deviations in productivity  among the decades.  In fact, however, the perfor- 
mance is better than these figures suggest. Only 12 percent of the drop between 
the  1820s and the  1830s is explained; but notice that the productivity  curve 
described in the second column of  figures is much flatter, between the 1830s 
and the 188Os, than is the curve described by the first column. This characteris- 
tic of the second column can be exhibited most clearly in the decrements (or 
increments) in the coefficients between the 1830s and each of the subsequent 
decades (table 8.4). Notice that the equation explains between 65 and 100 per- 
cent of the changes between the 1830s and subsequent decades. 
It appears, then, that the equations in table 8.2 account for only a small part 
of the drop in productivity between the 1820s and the 1830s, the early years of 
the industry, but are much more successful in explaining the movements  of 
productivity in the mature industry. 




Decade  is) 
1830s  -  ,284 
1840s  -.390 
1850s  -.574 
1860s  -.738 
1870s  -.728 
1880s  -.736 











% Explained by 
Complex Equation 








Table 8.4  Changes in Coefficients of Dummies 
Changes in Coefficients from 
1830s 
Simple  Complex  % Explained by 
Decade  Equation  Equation  Complex Equation 
1840s  -.I06  +  .004 
1850s  -  ,290  -. 102 
1860s  -  .454  -  ,092 
1870s  -  .444  -  .025 
1880s  -  ,452  -  ,068 
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What do the equations tell us about productivity in New Bedford whaling? 
The specifications of the three regressions differ only slightly. In the first and 
third  the  competition index  appears in  quadratic  form; in  the  second, the 
squared term is dropped. The first and second regressions include separate 
hunting-pressure indexes for baleen and sperm whales; the third employs an 
index that is intended to measure hunting pressures on all whale populations 
taken together. 
To begin with the stocks of whales, the signs on the index of hunting pres- 
sure on baleens are positive. There is no indication that hunting baleens led 
to lower productivity, a finding that confirms the impression conveyed by the 
evidence of chapter 4 that American whaling did not collapse for lack of ba- 
leen whales. 
The story with respect to sperm whales is less clear. In the first model the 
sign on the sperm hunting-pressure index is negative, and the significance level 
is high: the equation indicates that hunting pressures on sperm whales did lead 
to lower productivity levels. The effect was apparently not large. In the period 
between the opening of each ground (after 1819) and the highest level of hunt- 
ing pressure, the effect of hunting was to lower the productivity index by .041 
in the Atlantic, .010 in the Indian, and .130 in the Pacific.*  Compared with the 
dependent mean, .699, only the effect in the Pacific is substantial enough to 
warrant special attention. Even in this case, the implicit decline in productivity 
was about 0.5 percent per year (that is, one two-hundredth of the productivity 
level) across the period of expansion in the Pacific. Furthermore, the results 
with respect to the pressures on sperms are not stable. For example, in the 
second equation displayed in table 8.2, which differs in only one respect from 
the first, the coefficient on the sperm-whale hunting-pressure index drops to 
only four-tenths of  that in the first; and the t value shows that the second- 
equation  coefficient is not  significantly different from zero. In view of  the 
enormous size of the sample, 1 values should perhaps receive little attention. If 
the regression is regarded as no more than descriptive, it is descriptive of more 
than 60 percent of the industry. The instability of the coefficient on the vari- 
able, however, does raise questions about the impact of the hunting of sperm 
whales on productivity. It does not seem probable that hunting pressures con- 
tributed in an important way to the decline of productivity and the eventual 
demise of the whaling fleet. This conclusion is supported by the third equation, 
where the sign on the combined hunting-pressure index is positive. There is no 
support to be drawn from this regression for the assertion that whaling produc- 
tivity fell as a consequence of overhunting. 
The competition indexes provide little support for the argument that crowd- 
ing on the hunting grounds seriously affected productivity. The quadratic form 
of the index was entered in the first and third equations, the index alone, in the 
8. These numbers were  calculated by  applying the  coefficients  in  the  table  to  the  relevant 
hunting-pressure index values. For the hunting-pressure indexes see appendix 8A. 313  Productivity 
second. The significance levels on the variables in the first and third regressions 
are good, but the coefficients are very small. These results suggest that negative 
consequences must have appeared only at very high levels of crowding, and 
that even in these instances they must have been minute. The squared form of 
the index was dropped from the second equation. The sign on the index alone 
is indeed negative, but the coefficient is so small that the effects of crowding 
could not have been important. For example, if this coefficient is applied to 
conditions in the Western Arctic, it appears that the increase in crowding in 
that  ground between  January  1850 and March  1853-the  month  when  the 
competition index hits its apogee-caused  productivity to fall by  OL9  There 
is no other instance in which the degree of crowding changed so much. If 
competition  ever affected productivity unfavorably, it must have done so in 
this period.I0 The findings are clear: the negative consequences of competition 
were negligible." 
Unlike hunting pressures and competition, the series of wage rates ashore 
yield the expected results; the coefficients are large, given the range within 
which the wage series moved (86 points, for the common wage, between 1820 
and 1896; .52, for the ratio of the skilled to the common wage); they have the 
expected sign; and they are significantly different from zero at an appropriate 
level.Iz It appears that competition for labor from activities ashore did indeed 
bid away the best whalemen, with unfavorable consequences for productivity. 
That argument is admittedly indirect, and more evidence must be assembled 
before its conclusions can be enthusiastically embraced. 
As to the choices made by whaling agents, it seems that their preference for 
ships and their tendency to adopt larger vessels as time passed were sensible. 
Ships were  substantially more productive than other vessels;  within  limits, 
larger vessels were more productive than  smaller ones. (Given  the  tonnage 
range within which most whalers lay-the  interquartile range of  vessels was 
15 1 tons and of voyages only 12  1 tons-size  was not of overwhelming impor- 
tance.) Their decision to shift-during  the heyday of New Bedford whaling- 
from the Atlantic,  to the  Indian, to the  Pacific,  and  finally  to the Western 
Arctic also is shown to be well motivated, if the pursuit of high productivity 
was  sensible.  (The profit  consequences  of  these  changes  are  considered  in 
chapter 11.) 
9. The competition index in January 1850 in the Western Arctic was 4.1; in March 1853 it was 
213.1. See appendix 8B. 
10. The possibility that the variable voyage length was capturing overhunting and competition 
led us to drop the variable in one run, to see if the signs, coefficients, or significance levels of the 
pressure and competition indexes changed dramatically. They did not. 
11. This conclusion does not rule out the possibility that competition or overhunting affected 
productivity on more narrowly defined hunting grounds (for example, the Baja calving grounds). 
If such developments had been important to the whaling fleet, however, their impact would surely 
also be observable in the statistical results for the larger hunting grounds identified by the regres- 
sion equations in table 8.2. 
12. The skilled wage rate is expressed as a ratio to the common wage rate in order to avoid 
problems of multicollinearity. 314  Chapter 8 
Several of the variables bear on the impacts of technology. The effects of 
changes in  vessel  design  are presumably  captured  chiefly  by  the  variables 
listed under the heading “mode of entry into the fleet.” The statistical results 
based on these variables show that vessels built  as merchantmen  after 1849 
and then transferred into the whaling fleet were substantially more productive 
(the advantage is about 20 percent of the dependent mean) than vessels built 
before  1850 and then transferred  into the whaling fleet; this is the expected 
result,  given  that  the  designs of  merchantmen  improved  dramatically  after 
1850 (see chapter 7). What is surprising is that the two variables representing 
vessels built as whalers after 1849 have coefficients of the wrong sign in two 
of the regressions and the wrong value in all three. Vessels built after 1870 are 
shown to be less productive than those built between  1850 and 1870. In two of 
the three regressions, both groups-those  built after 1870 and those built be- 
tween 1850 and 1870-are  less productive than vessels built before 1850. The 
significance levels are very poor, but even if  we accept the implication  that 
these coefficients are not different from zero, they indicate that vessels built 
after  1849 were no  less productive  than the ones built before  1850-small 
comfort, given that the literature says they were much better designed. 
Vessels built before  1850 were hunting, on the whole, during a more favor- 
able period than vessels built after 1849, since average productivity was higher 
before  than  after  1849. Is it possible  that the unexpected  results  described 
above reflect this phenomenon? That is, could the results reflect the circum- 
stances of the years after 1849, rather than the quality of the vessels built then? 
The regression is comprehensive enough that the average productivity levels 
peculiar  to the periods before  1850 and after  1849 should not influence the 
results obtained on variables recording  the years vessels  were built. For ex- 
ample, the regression clearly shows that merchantmen  built after  1849 were 
much  more productive  than  those  built  before  1850. Nonetheless,  on the 
chance that the results are affected by the periods of time during which these 
various groups of whalers were hunting, the regression was rerun for the period 
from 1870 onward. That specification yields, in effect, a cross-section regres- 
sion. The results (not shown) improved a little, but not much. The signs on the 
two dummies representing vessels built as whalers in the periods 1850-69  and 
1870-96  are now positive, a good result; the coefficient on the dummy repre- 
senting the later period is larger, by a wide margin, than the one on the dummy 
representing the earlier period, an even better result: the vessels with the more 
advanced technology, per chapter 7, were more productive than those with the 
less advanced technology. Unfortunately, the t values are very  Further- 
13. Notice that in this regression, as distinct from the previous one, the vessels built as whalers 
are being compared with older vessels (converted merchantmen) operating contemporaneously 
with them. Presumably the age variables in the regression pick up the unfavorable effects of age, 
so that the comparison remains legitimate. The comparison vessels are not only older, however; 
they are also survivors. The regression does not adjust for this characteristic, so that in this respect 
the comparison is biased against a finding of high productivity for vessels built as whalers. 315  Productivity 
more,  the  dummies  representing  vessels  built  expressly  for  whaling  have 
smaller coefficients than the one representing  vessels built  as merchantmen 
and subsequently converted. These results, obviously, are counterintuitive, and 
we have no explanation for them. 
The technological  dummy  is designed to measure the effect of  improve- 
ments in whalecraft, although it may also pick up some part of the improve- 
ment properly attributed to vessel design. The variable works very well. The 
coefficient is large, of the right sign, and stable from one regression formula- 
tion to the next; the significance level is high. 
A final technological variable relates to rerigging, chiefly the rerigging of 
ships as barks. Rerigged vessels are shown to have a productivity advantage. 
Their superiority might have been due to the relative speed (as compared with 
construction) with which they could be produced. When the Western Arctic 
opened, rerigged vessels could be thrown quickly into that ground and could 
scoop off the first-arrival gains. This factor may be the source of the positive 
coefficient on the rerigged variable, although one would think that the Arctic- 
ground dummy would capture this effect. The earlier discussion of  the very 
limited consequences of crowding in the Western Arctic also suggests that first- 
arrival gains were not quickly dissipated. If first arrival is not the correct expla- 
nation, then rerigging represents the introduction of improved technology, and 
the results of the new technology were clearly favorable. 
The findings with respect to the remaining choice variables are mixed. The 
coefficients on the age variables are very small and are not significantly differ- 
ent from zero. Apparently, old vessels performed as well, or nearly as well, as 
new ones. How far these results reflect selection bias is anybody's guess, but 
presumably the survivors were the vessels that had been most successful. 
The coefficient on the last-voyage dummy suggests that vessels were with- 
drawn from whaling for reasons other than poor productivity  on the last voy- 
age. The last-voyage variable has the wrong sign, the coefficient is very small, 
and according to the t value the coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero. 
Specialists in baleen hunting appear to have done better, ceteris paribus, than 
both the specialists in sperm whaling and the nonspecialists. Why were baleen 
specialists more productive? Most of the factors that differentiate baleen from 
sperm specialists figure in variables  that have already been  considered; the 
sources of the remaining differences are unknown. 
The sign on voyage length is wrong, if voyage length is taken to be only an 
index of the impact of the innovation of the reprovisioning port. The variable 
also seems to pick up the bad luck or lack of skill that kept some vessels long 
at sea. Given the sign of the coefficient, the lack of luck or skill seems to have 
had the greater effect (see note 3), but the effect was not large. For example, 
given the sizes of the coefficients, a twenty-four-month difference in voyage 
length was associated with a difference in productivity of only 12 or 13  percent 
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Finally, the  coefficients  on  the  detrending  variable,  time,  are  small. Ac- 
cording to the t values, they are not significantly different from zero. Ignoring 
the t values, the equations indicate that, ceteris paribus, productivity  declined 
by between 0.1 and 0.3 percent per year, between 1821 and 1896. Since there 
is little left to be explained by  the portmanteau variable time, it appears that 
the equation is reasonably complete. 
8.4  Tests of the Multivariate Analysis 
The regression  analysis unfolds reasonably and seems to reveal important 
aspects of forces at work on U.S. whaling productivity. Still, some of  the vari- 
ables are less than perfect and pose interpretive  problems. Two  sets-those 
bearing on labor quality and on techniques of production-deserve  further at- 
tention. 
The productivity  index for the fleet as a whole declined from  1821 to the 
1860s, while the wage rate ashore rose. The strong negative association be- 
tween the wage series and the productivity series may describe only the numer- 
ical relations between two trends that have no true theoretical connection. This 
proposition can be tested by differencing or detrending the data. The procedure 
has already been carried out in the regressions in table 8.2, where time serves 
as detrender. A second and stronger effort is described in the equation in table 
8.5. Notice that the data set is restricted to the period 1834-96,  a period during 
which productivity dropped and then rose, reaching again in the mid- 1890s the 
level of the mid-1830s. Time appears once again as a detrender, but now in the 
form of time and time squared. If  in the first equation the relations between 
the trends in the wage rate and the productivity  series down to the mid-1850s 
alone produced the sign and coefficient on the wage-rate  series, one would 
think that, in the new formulation, the wage-rate series would no longer exhibit 
the same characteristics. In fact, however, it does. The ratio of the skilled to 
the common wage rate is not significant  at as high a level as before, but  it 
is very close to being significant at the 10 percent level. The common wage- 
rate series retains a large negative value-slightly  larger than before-and  is 
significantly different from zero at better than the 1 percent level. The correla- 
tions between the coefficients of the two time variables and the common wage 
coefficient are also very small (-0.082  and -0.035).  The wage series appears 
to be capturing something other than time. The conclusions that (1  j the quality 
of whalemen deteriorated as opportunities ashore improved and (2) the decline 
in  the  quality  of  crews  tended  to lower  productivity,  ceteris  paribus,  are 
strengthened. 
Two other features of this regression  are worthy of notice. First, the signs, 
coefficient  values, and significance  levels of  most of  the  variables are very 
similar to those in table 8.2-which  is reassuring, since it suggests that the 
identified relationships are stable. Moreover, the significance levels are high 
across the board. Second, since productivity  began to increase late in the pe- Table 8.5  Productivity in New Bedford Whaling, Sailing Years 1834-96 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Factor Productivity 
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-  0.01  92* 
0.0003* 
Note: See table 8.2. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level. 318  Chapter 8 
riod (see figure l.l), one might have supposed before the fact that the introduc- 
tion of time squared would displace the technological dummy-a  dummy that 
divides the observations at 1  January 1870. In fact, it does not. The technologi- 
cal dummy retains a large coefficient, although not as large as before. It is 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The wage variables were introduced to test  a hypothesis drawn from the 
whaling literature: as wage rates ashore went up, the best men were bid out of 
whaling, the quality of the crews deteriorated, and productivity fell. The mod- 
eling of  this hypothesis in table 8.2 is straightforward enough, linking, as it 
does, the underlying cause (higher wage rates ashore) with the ultimate conse- 
quence (lower productivity  in whaling). There are also indications that wage 
rates ashore rose relative to the earnings of  whalemen  (see chapter 5). The 
middle  step in the traditional argument-the  deterioration in the quality of 
crews-is,  however, bypassed in this analysis. Did crews really decline in qual- 
ity? Yes, they did. For a limited stretch of years-1840-58  and 1866-there 
are quality indexes at the voyage level. With these data it is possible to look 
directly at the links between crew quality and productivity. 
Table 8.6 reports the results of three regressions that do so. The first is virtu- 
ally identical to the first equation in table 8.2. It omits (necessarily) the techno- 
logical variable, but-except  that it is fit to only  1,112 voyages beginning in 
the years  1840-58  and  1866-it  is otherwise unchanged. Notice that, with a 
few notable exceptions, the results of the two equations are very similar. The 
relationships are stable. 
The second equation in table 8.6 is almost the same as the first, except that 
direct indexes of labor quality-the  percentage of the crew that is illiterate, 
the percentage of the crew consisting of greenhands-are  substituted for the 
wage rates ashore. The results are not what might have been  expected. The 
coefficients on these variables are very small, and the larger carries the wrong 
sign; neither is significantly different from zero at a conventionally acceptable 
level. The suggestion is that the decline in labor quality had no effect on pro- 
ductivity. 
The third equation incorporates both the wage rates ashore and the two in- 
dexes of  crew quality. The wage-rate  variables again carry reasonably  large 
coefficients, they  have  the  correct  signs, and  they  are  significant  at  a  de- 
manding level.I4  The two quality indexes have larger coefficients than before, 
but they are of the wrong sign if these variables are to be interpreted as indexes 
of the quality of labor. If instead they are regarded as indicators of the adoption 
of new technology, the signs are correct. Perhaps the wage series capture the 
effects of  the tendency for opportunities ashore to advance faster than those 
afloat and, therefore, for the best men to be bid away from whaling. That leaves 
14. For example, the real common wage rate ashore rose from a level of sixty-eight in  1842 to 
ninety-one in  1857, a twenty-three-point gain. Multiplying the coefficient of  the real wage-rate 
index by thirty-eight yields a very large value, compared with the dependent mean, .695. Table 8.6  Productivity in New Bedford Whaling, Sailing Years 1840-58  and 1866 
Dependent Variable: 
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-9.05  x 10-7 
-0.00060 
0.0003 




















Sources: Most of the data come from the works cited in the notes to table 8.2. The information on illiteracy 
and greenhands comes from the Stations and Lays Data Set. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level. 320  Chapter 8 
the quality indexes to pick up the favorable effects of adopting new methods. 
That is, the wage series bear on the changes across time in the ability of whal- 
ing to compete for men, while the quality indexes refer mainly to the differ- 
ences in the cross-section between vessels that had adopted the new methods 
(and could therefore ship crews composed  mainly of unskilled greenhands) 
and those that had not. At least this explanation makes the most sense of the 
strong statistical results reported in table 8.6. 
The other measures of new technology, the two dummies representing ves- 
sels built  after  1849, do not perform well in these regressions.  That may be 
simply because few new vessels of the designated types had yet appeared on 
the scene in these years. The labor-quality indexes perform better, probably 
because they capture cases in which the new technology was introduced by 
reworking  old vessels. The two vessel-construction  dummies  do not reflect 
such changes, of course. The rerigging variable probably does, and that vari- 
able performs very well. 
In summary, after 1820 shifts in the economic environment pressured whal- 
ing agents to change their ways. The rapid growth of the demand for lubricants 
and illuminants led agents to send their captains farther and farther from home. 
Whalemen opened rich grounds in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and 
the Pacific. The subsequent shift in the structure of demand-favoring  whale- 
bone over sperm and whale oil-sent  captains to the North Pacific in search 
of  right whales.  One was  venturesome enough  to push  through the Bering 
Strait into the Bering Sea, where he found a profusion of  the greatest of the 
whalebone whales, the bowhead. He was quickly followed by many others. 
These changes in demand and in hunting grounds, coupled with emerging 
labor problems, led agents to reorganize the industry In place of the fourteen- 
month voyage to Davis Strait and the Atlantic, typical of the early nineteenth 
century, voyages of two, three, and even four or more years to the Indian Ocean, 
the Pacific, and the Western Arctic became common. Different vessel types 
(ships in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, barks in the Western Arctic) and 
new designs of  each type (clipper style, with heavy use of  power winches) 
were adopted. The new designs came in part from unspecialized builders for 
the merchant marine, in part from architects who specialized in whalers. The 
designs made it possible to save on experienced labor, an increasingly scarce 
input. 
Longer voyages led agents to adopt larger vessels and to utilize the devel- 
oping resupply  and transshipment points in the Azores, Hawaii, Panama, and 
the West Coast of  the United States. In the whaleboats the whaling  gun re- 
placed the handheld lance; toward the end the darting gun, the most effective 
American whalecraft innovation, was widely adopted. 
These changes in environment and agents’ reactions to them are given quan- 
titative expression in the regressions exhibited in this chapter. The findings call 
for no extended summary. The most interesting results show that productivity 
was not adversely affected by overhunting or crowding on the hunting grounds. 321  Productivity 
Of  particular interest is the finding-well  recognized in the whaling litera- 
ture-that,  as time passed, labor problems emerged and that they were, in all 
likelihood, a result of relatively favorable alternative opportunities ashore. Per- 
haps in response to this development, new vessel designs that saved on experi- 
enced labor were introduced, and seem to have had favorable effects on pro- 
ductivity. Innovations in whalecraft, concentrated in a relatively short period, 
were also effective. 
The account rendered in this chapter considers the decisions of agents that 
bore on productivity. It does not take up the agents themselves, nor does it treat 
the captains. These subjects-including  their relationship with productivity- 
are discussed in chapter 10. 
Appendix 8A 
Derivation of  the Hunting-Pressure Indexes 
The hunting-pressure indexes were constructed to allow us to test the proposi- 
tions that (1) whales were hunted so intensively in the nineteenth century that 
they became scarce-or  wary-and  (2) as a result of hunting, the capture of 
the typical whale called for the expenditure of more labor and capital than had 
previously been necessary (i.e., productivity in whaling declined). 
We  began with Tower’s estimates (1907, 126) of  the volume of  whale oil, 
sperm oil, and whalebone brought into the United States by American whalers 
in the years 1805-1905. From 1805 through 1837 the oil figures are expressed 
in gallons, thereafter in barrels. We  converted the earlier figures into values 
expressed in barrels by  dividing Tower’s gallon estimates by  31.5. (A typical 
barrel of oil contained 31.5 gallons.) 
Our plan was to estimate, on the basis of the oil imports, the numbers of 
whales killed. Toward the end of  the period, however, baleen  whalers fre- 
quently took only the bone from captured whales, and the aggregate whale oil 
imports after about 1886 are therefore not good indicators of the numbers of 
whales killed. Consequently, we derived a second whale oil series, based on 
bone imports, and intended to measure the oil that could have been extracted 
from the baleens killed, had they all been tried out. The second series rested 
on the assumption that one barrel of oil could have been extracted from a ba- 
leen whale for each fourteen pounds of bone taken. The figure was based on a 
study of oil and bone imports in the 1860s, 1870s, and early 1880s, before the 
ratio began to move up dramatically. In these years the ratio varied widely from 
year to year but showed no trend. We  took the largest value for these years, 
that for 1868, and assumed that any larger figure in a later year indicated that 
blubber was being discarded. After 1886 all of the ratios are larger, and there- 
fore we replaced the oil imports of those years by new estimates. The estimates 322  Chapter 8 
unfortunately  do not exhibit the degree of variation from year to year that the 
true figures before 1886 do. It is also possible that the level of the estimates is 
too low, but we do not think it is. In the years after 1886, bowheads probably 
came to dominate the baleens being taken, and the ratio of bone to oil in bow- 
heads was larger than  for other baleens. Consequently,  employing the peak 
figure of 1868 as the basis for our estimates is reasonable enough. 
The two final oil series-sperm  and whale-were  then  used  to estimate 
the numbers of whales killed by Americans to obtain this oil. The estimating 
coefficients were taken from chapter 4. Specifically, we assumed that, on aver- 
age, 33.6 barrels of oil could be recovered from a sperm whale, and that, in 
addition to the whales taken, another 10 percent were killed but lost. The num- 
ber of sperm whales killed to obtain the oil imported each year was computed 
as the product  of  the  number of barrels imported  and the  fraction  .032738 
(1.1/33.6), rounded to a whole number. Notice that the procedure makes no 
allowance for variations from year to year in the average sizes of whales taken, 
or for long-term trends in size. There is no way in which the former variations 
can be taken into account, and chapter 4 suggests that long-term changes in 
size were not pronounced. The same procedures were used in the case of ba- 
leen whales, except that the average baleen was estimated to contain seventy- 
three barrels of oil and the estimating coefficient is .0150684. 
The number of whales was then distributed among hunting grounds in pro- 
portion to the New Bedford catch (Voyages Data Set). 
Next we added in the British catch for the years up to the mid-1840s. The 
British were important hunters in this period, but the British fleet fell away to 
virtually nothing in the 1840s and did not recover until the end of the century. 
It is essential that estimates of British hunting be included in the early years, 
but some of the figures we were able to put together are quite weak, and that 
point must be borne in mind. 
The data for the  British northern  fleet  (the Atlantic,  Hudson  Bay,  Davis 
Strait) are from Jackson  (1978, 270), they refer to numbers of  whales taken, 
and they are excellent. We assumed that all of  these whales were baleens. For 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans combined, we estimated the catch on the basis 
of the tonnage of the British southern fleet (Jackson [  1361 interpolated to fill 
gaps) and the productivity of the northern fleet (whales/tonnage). The catch- 
which we assumed consisted exclusively of  sperm whales-was  divided be- 
tween the Indian and Pacific Oceans on the basis of the New Bedford catch. 
The estimates in the various grounds were then scaled, by dividing each by 
the number of  whales originally in the ground. The estimates in table 8A.1, 
based on chapter 4, were used for this purpose. 
Virtually no sperm whales were taken in the Western Arctic. There are two 
ways to handle the statistical problem thus posed, and we used both. First, we 
assumed that the ratio of sperms killed to sperms originally in the Western 
Arctic ground was equal to the average for the remaining three grounds. This 
assumption permits calculations to be made, although the results with respect 323  Productivity 
Table 8A.1  Estimated Whale Populations before Intensive Hunting Began 
Sperm  Baleen  Total 
Atlantic  280,000  66,000  346,000 
Pacific  1,574,000  255,000  1,829,000 
Indian  502,000  42,000  544,000 
Western Arctic  -  30,000  30,000 
to sperms in the Western Arctic are meaningless. The second technique was to 
combine baleens and sperms and produce only one hunting-pressure index per 
ground, instead of two. 
Next, four-year moving averages were run for each index, and then all the 
indexes were converted to relatives of the figure for the Pacific in 1855 (average 
of  1851-54).  See table 8A.2. 
Index numbers were associated with voyages in the following way. A vessel 
leaving for the Pacific in  1821, for example, was associated with three index 
numbers (sperm, baleen, combined), each of which is the average for the years 
1817, 1818, 1819, and  1820. The assumption is that if previous hunting af- 
fected the productivity  of  a voyage unfavorably, it would be hunting over a 
period of years that counted, not just hunting in the year before the voyage 
began.  How many years should be included is moot; four seems better than 
three; many more than four would become cumbersome. 
Appendix 8B 
Derivation of the Competition Indexes 
The competition indexes were constructed for use in the regression analysis of 
productivity. The underlying assumption is that productivity was likely to be 
unfavorably affected by competition on the hunting ground, not because the 
stock of whales was being hunted down (a hypothesis tested using the hunting- 
pressure indexes), but because on a crowded hunting ground the prospective 
whale victim of vessel A might be taken instead by vessel B, thus diminishing 
A's  productivity. 
The form of the index for any year is, then, easily imagined. The index is 
computed by dividing the number of vessel tons on a given hunting ground by 
the ratio of the number of whales on the hunting ground to the square miles 
composing the hunting ground. The smaller the ratio in the denominator, cet- 
eris paribus, the greater the competition for whales and the higher the index. 
Similarly, the larger the number of tons on the hunting ground, ceteris paribus, 
the  greater  the  competition  and  the  higher  the  index.  Index  numbers  are 
attached to voyages, to measure the competition the vessels faced. Table 8A.2  Indexes of Hunting Pressure on Stocks of Whales, by Ocean, 
1820-1905  (Pacific 1855 = 100) 
A. Atlantic Ocean 
























































































































































































- Table 8A.2  (continued) 
A. Atlantic Ocean 

































































































































































B . Indian Ocean 
Index Year  Baleen  Sperm  All Whales 
1820-28' 
1829  O.OO0  O.OO0  0.000 
1830  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-  -  - 
(continued) Table 8A.2  (continued) 
B. Indian Ocean 




























































































































































































- Table 8A.2  (continued) 
B. Indian Ocean 





































C. Pacific Ocean 




































































































13  1.02  1 
130.464 



































103.317 Table SA.2  (continued) 
C. Pacific Ocean 




























































































































































































6.999 Table 8A.2  (continued) 
C. Pacific Ocean 






5.819  8.873  7.092 
5.639  8.746  6.934 
3.934  7.164  5.280 
2.260  7.897  4.609 
2.458  7.567  4.587 
D. Western Arctic Ocean 
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Table 8A.2  (continued) 
D. Western Arctic Ocean 
Index Year  Baleen  Sperm  All Whales 
-  -  -  1886-9  la 
1892  0.000  O.Oo0  O.OO0 
1893-1904“  -  -  - 
1905  0.OOO  O.OO0  O.OO0 
“No  New Bedford voyages set out for this hunting ground. 
To compute the denominators it was necessary to make three assumptions, 
none of which is perfectly realistic: the  size of each hunting ground and the 
number of whales in each hunting ground remained constant over time; whales 
of  different species were sufficiently  close in value that numbers of  whales 
could be summed up without regard to species. The lack of perfect realism is 
unlikely to be important for present purposes. The object of the denominators 
is to distinguish hunting grounds, not periods  of time.  For this purpose the 
denominators appear to be adequate. The data from which the denominators 
were constructed and the denominators themselves are shown in table 8B. 1. 
The estimates of the numbers of whales are taken from chapter 4; the square 
miles in the hunting grounds were estimated using an atlas and information 
about the parts of each ocean or sea in which whales were typically hunted. 
The numerators were constructed by estimating the number of tons of New 
Bedford whaling vessels in each ground in each month from January 1816 to 
December 1906, then blowing up these estimates to account for whaling ves- 
sels from other American ports.  The Atlantic, Pacific,  and Indian estimates 
were next increased to take into account British whaling  in the years before 
1846, and the Pacific and Western Arctic estimates to take into account Hawai- 
ian whaling (1851-80). 
When a New Bedford vessel’s tonnage was missing, we estimated it on the 
basis of  rigging: ship, 300 tons; bark, 250; brig,  150; schooner,  100; sloop, 
100; rigging unknown, 200.  When a date necessary to determine months at sea 
was missing-for  example, the arrival date-we  assumed the vessel was at sea 
for twenty months. If the sailing or arrival year was present but the month was 
missing, we assumed it was June. 
We also assumed that New Bedford whalers destined for the Atlantic arrived 
there in the month they sailed, and left there in the month they returned to port; 
vessels destined for the Pacific or Indian Ocean arrived on the ground three 
months after they left port,  and vacated the ground two months before they 
arrived home; vessels destined for the Western Arctic reached the ground six 
months after sailing from New Bedford, and got back seven months after leav- 
ing the Arctic. These estimates were made on the basis of the diaries of people 331  Productivity 
Table 8B.1  Data Used to Construct Ratio of Whales to Area of Hunting Ground 
Whales  Square Miles  Whales/ 
(millions)  (millions)  Square Mile 
Atlantic  0.346  10.00  0.0346 
Pacific  1.829  22.00  0.0831 
Indian  0.544  7.00  0.0777 
Western Arctic  0.030  2.17  .  0.0138 
who sailed on whalers. The available reports are quite consistent. The time 
trend appears to be zero. 
Some vessels started for the Pacific or Indian or Western Arctic, but obvi- 
ously never got there: they were too short a time at sea. Competition indexes 
were not calculated for these vessels, and they were thus dropped from the 
productivity analysis. (For example, we assume that a ship going to the Pacific 
that spent less than five months at sea never got to the Pacific.) 
The domestic blowup  ratios  were  computed from data in  Tower  1907, 
121-25  (numbers of vessels, not tons). The form of the data prohibit the con- 
struction of separate ratios for individual hunting grounds; one ratio had to be 
applied to all grounds in each year. Tower cites Starbuck (1878), 1784-1839 
(clearances); Clark (1887a), 1840-80  (probably also clearances); and the WSL 
(1843-1914),  1880-1906  (vessels in the fleet). The figures refer only to the 
U.S. fleet. The clearances data should ideally be averaged over some period of 
time, to approximate the situation of the fleet at sea, while the data from the 
WSL  need not, in principle, be averaged. Something can be said for averaging, 
however, on the ground that sharp movements from one year to the next are 
unlikely properly to reflect shifts in competitive pressures from one year to the 
next. Table 8B.2 gives the raw figures, five-year moving averages, and rounded 
versions of both. The rounded average figures were used as blowup ratios. 
The adjustments to take into account British whaling before 1845 were com- 
puted from data in Jackson  1978, 136, 270. We  treated Jackson’s “Northern 
Fleet” as an Atlantic fleet, and his “Southern Fleet” as a Pacific and Indian 
fleet, although some of these vessels were probably hunting the South Atlantic. 
British tons were roughly equivalent to American tons. (See chapter 12.) For 
the southern fleet Jackson has data only for the first three years of the decades 
of  the  1820s and  1830s, and  for  1841,  1842, and  1843. We  interpolated 
(straight line) to obtain the missing values. Jackson has tons for the northern 
fleet (very much the larger of the two) for the years 1815 through  1834. We 
rounded to hundreds of tons and extrapolated down to 1842 on the number of 
vessels in the ground. For the northern fleet we extrapolated a disappearance 
rate from 1842 to 1845, for the southern fleet from 1843 to 1845. The British 
tonnage in the northern fleet was then added to the American Atlantic tonnage. 
The British tonnage in the southern fleet was divided between the Indian and Table 8B.2  Ratios of the Tonnage of the U.S. Whaling Fleet to the Tonnage of the 
New Bedford Whaling Fleet, 1816-1906 
















































































































































1.743 Table 8B.2  (continued) 



































































































































Note: The text describes the construction of these ratios. 334  Chapter 8 
the Pacific in the same proportions as the American tonnage. We reduced the 
British tonnage in these two grounds by 25 percent, to allow for travel time. 
We made no allowances for the British fleet after 1845. The resulting estimates 
of British tonnage are given in table 8B.3. 
We added data on vessels sailing from Honolulu, 185  1-80,  drawn from Heg- 
arty 1959, 48-50.  In those instances when only a sailing or an arrival date is 
given, we assumed the voyage took six months. If  only the year is given, we 
assumed the voyage ran  from April through  September.  For voyages to the 
Western Arctic, one month was deducted from the beginning and one from the 
end of the voyage, to account for travel time. In those few instances in which 
the prospective hunting ground is not given, all voyages leaving in the summer, 
fall, and winter were assumed to be Pacific voyages; spring voyages were as- 
signed alternately to the Western Arctic and the Pacific. Our estimates of Ho- 
nolulu tonnage are given in table 8B.4. 
The results of  these calculations are represented in table 8B.5. The competi- 
tion index itself is monthly; the table shows figures for July of each year. 
Table 8B.3  Tonnage of the British Whaling Fleet, 1820-45  (thousands of tons) 
Northern  Southern 















































































Source: Jackson 1978, 136,270. Table 8B.4  Tonnage of the Honolulu Whaling Fleet, 18.51-80 
Months 
Western 
Arctic  Pacific 
May-August  185  1 
September 1851-February  1852 
March-May  1852 
June-September  1852 
October 1852-October  1853 
November 1853-April  1854 
May-September  I854 
October 1854-April  1855 
May-June  1855 
July 1855 
August 1855 
September-October  1855 
November 1855 
December 1855 
January-March  1856 
April 1856 
May  1856 
June 1856 
July-August  1856 
September 1856 
October 1856 
November 1856-January 1857 
February-March  1857 
April 1857 
May  1857 




December 1857-January  1858 
February 1858 
March 1858 
April  1858 
May  1858 
June 1858 




December 1858-March  1859 
April 1859 
May  1859 




December 1859-April  1860 

































































































827 Table 8B.4  (continued) 
Months 
Western 






January-February  1861 
March 1861 
April 1861 
May  1861 
June-August  1861 
September 186  1 
October 1861 
November 186  1 
December 1861-March  1862 
April 1862 






January-April  1863 
May  1863 
June-August  1863 
September-November  1863 
December 1863 
January-March  1864 
April-May  1864 
June-September  1864 
October 1864 
November-December  1864 
January-March  1865 
April 1865 
May  1865 




January-April  1866 
May  1866 
June 1866 





July-August  1860 
































































































326 Table 8B.4  (continued) 
Months 
Western 
Arctic  Pacific 
January-April  1867 
May  1867 




December 1867-February 1868 
March 1868 
April 1868 







February-March  1869 
April 1869 












May  1870 
June 1870 
July 1870 





February-March  187  1 
April 187  1 
May  1871 
June-August  1871 
September 187  1 
October-November  187  1 
December 1871-May  1872 
June 1872 
July-September  1872 
October 1872 
368  326 
1,367  326 
1,367  0 
1,020  0 
750  0 
0  393 
0  918 
453  918 
1,191  550 
1,538  157 
1,070  157 
815  157 
0  0 
0  157 
0  412 
1,298  412 
1,654  412 
1,654  592 
1,924  592 
1,924  97  8 
1,924  798 
1,924  978 
1,924  1,409 
1,191  1,155 
0  1,195 
0  1,151 
916  1,151 
916  1,406 
916  975 
1,617  926 
1,797  926 
1,797  544 
2,434  544 
2,865  544 
2,327  544 
356  386 
787  0 
787  255 
1,173  255 
817  525 
1,452  270 
1,066  270 
43 1  270 
0  0 
43 1  188 
43 1  0 
718  0 
287  0 
(continued) Table 8B.4  (continued) 
Months 
Western 
Arctic  Pacific 









December 1873-February  1874 
March 1874 
April 1874 
May-August  1874 
September 1874-April  1875 
May-August  1875 
September 1875-April  1876 
May-August  1876 
September 1876-April  1877 
May-August  1877 
September 1877-April  1878 
May-August  1878 
September 1878-April  1879 
May-August  1879 
September 1879-April  1880 
May 1880 
June-August  1880 
September 1880 
October-December  1880 
0 























































Source: Hegarty 1959,48-50. Table 8B.5  Indexes of Competition (crowding) on the Whaling Grounds, 
1820-1905  (Pacific, July 1855 = 100) 
Western 












































































































































































































































127.77 Table 8B.5  (continued) 






































































































































































































Notes; An index number of 0.00 means that there were no whaling vessels in the ground. Only the 
month of July is represented in the table, but the indexes are computed for each month, and the 
index numbers vary within a year. For example, in 1855 the monthly numbers are: 
Western 
Month  Atlantic  Indian  Pacific  Arctic 
January  11.61  16.19  120.98  109.90 
February  11.61  15.86  121.73  115.04 Table 8B.5  (continued) 
Western 
Month  Atlantic  Indian  Pacific  Arctic 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
12.88 
12.88 
12.98 
14.02 
14.56 
16.16 
15.20 
13.42 
13.42 
13.42 
17.73 
18.79 
18.79 
18.79 
18.79 
17.37 
20.56 
20.93 
22.74 
23.63 
111.10 
106.96 
102.84 
99.63 
100.00 
97.77 
98.61 
100.19 
108.27 
113.44 
131.97 
154.10 
177.52 
186.43 
186.43 
189.06 
188.27 
174.06 
161.30 
143.77 